The social sciences have a considerable history of attempts to apply models and theories from the physical sciences. All such attempts have failed, primarily because social scientists have commonly not distinguished between applications and possibly useful metaphors.
While excellent references to chaos are now commonplaces in the natural sciences, references to it in the social science literature are often problematic, making DDNS particularly welcome. My intent here is to explore why that has been the case and then to suggest how that leads to a productive extension of the role of DDNS.
A. THE BAD NEWS
Since their inception well over a century ago, the social sciences have been driven by metaphors. That is to be expected, and so long as we have not lost sight of the fact that we have been exploring metaphors, they have sometimes led to productive insights. It certainly does no harm to suppose for a time that children's minds might be like buckets or trees, or that they may learn the way rats learn to run a T-maze. The problems have arisen, and continue to rise, when social scientists have not distinguished between metaphors and applications.
There are many more specific exemplars, but it is best to begin with a general example of the consequences of failing to make that distinction. The idea is much older, but early in the nineteenth century Laplace laid out what he saw to be the implications of Newtonian mechanics; that the universe is a completely deterministic place everything in the past and in the future is linked in a long network of causes and effects. Our instruments are blunt and we are frail, but for Laplace the immediate task of all science is to understand parts of the chain and the long aim is to aspire to a 'theory of everything'.
Given the successes of research devolving from that premise in the physical sciences, it was scarcely surprising that it would spill over into the social sciences, all the way to the present. That, it has been supposed, is what science is all about. Some contempory analysts have demurred (see Morgenthau [2] and Schwab [3] ) but, particular when it is seen as an application of 'the scientific method', not just a metaphor, it continues to drive research and analysis.
We continue to use tools like linear regression analysis to attempt to use adolescent qualities and behavior to account for adult criminal lifestyles, to discover the effects of administrative style on institutional well-being, and on and on. Literally tens of thousands of graduate theses and professorial works have been published, now mainly to commend the authors for degrees, tenure, and promotions.
As long ago as when Jack Stevens [4] wrote, and more commonly recently, analysts have been pointing out that most social science research has contributed little more than truisms to practice. See, for example, Jackson [5] , Cronbach [6] , Schwab [7] and Shapiro [8] .
The root of the problem, Schwab [7] One of the best dialectics of the genre is to be found in Thomas [10] . The post-modernists need not concern us further here.
The majority of social scientists have sought other metaphors. It is obvious that the simple ones, such as that social institutions should be run like parliaments, armies, or, just now, businesses, are metaphors. But more cogent for the present purpose, scarcely has any scientific innovation come to general attention than a metaphor has made its way into the social sciences, often as a putative application.
There are many examples of the latter phenomenon, but quantum theory serves well to illustrate it.
In 1963 Maccia and Reynolds [11] In retrospect, as Jacobson et al. [12] pointed out at the time, the notion seems rather improbable. No one, so far as I know, has seriously pursued that suggestion. But attempts to 'apply' quantum theory in the social sciences have continued. It has been supposed that educational change might be understood as an 'application' of quantum theory and it has been continually invoked as a fuzzy explanation of free will.
Catastrophe theory, whatever its natural-science implications, has been similarly invoked to 'explain' everything from prison riots to animal behavior. In fact, the notion that the behavior of some systems cannot be modelled by functions because it may depend on the system's history as much as current parameters seems to have promise, as a metaphor. But beyond the first flurry there are now very few purported 'applications'.
It is now chaos theory's turn. For readers of DDNS it is not necessary to document its considerable impact in the natural sciences. They may be less aware of the degree to which 'applications' of chaos theory are now cited as explanations of social phenomena.
And we are back to Schwab's admonishment.
Models from elsewhere may (or may not) be useful as metaphors and we can possibly benefit from exploring them. Gould 13] , for example, without using the phrase, uses the qualities of chaotic systems as an apt metaphor in his analysis of the evolution of life. But they are metaphors, not laws to be applied. As has been the case with other 'applications', there are no current applications of chaos theory in the social sciences and there is no prospect that there ever will be. At best, it may be a useful metaphor. I cheerfully admit to having contributed to that discourse [14] . 
